oss-security - Re: [Xen-devel] [Xen-users] Xen Security Advisory 208 (CVE-2017-2615)

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Message-ID: <CAFLBxZYDfzwa_Te7ESD8syt7N79pZzgTEXDZE4=PuHzn0jHSug@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 14:26:11 +0000
From: George Dunlap <dunlapg@...ch.edu>
To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com>
Cc: "Xen.org security team" <security@....org>, "xen-users@...ts.xen.org" <xen-users@...ts.xen.org>, 
	xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, 
	"xen-devel@...ts.xen.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [Xen-users] Xen Security Advisory 208 (CVE-2017-2615)
 - oob access in cirrus bitblt copy

On Sat, Feb 11, 2017 at 8:49 AM, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 12:43:17PM +0000, Xen.org security team wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA1
>>
>>             Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-2615 / XSA-208
>>
>>                    oob access in cirrus bitblt copy
>>
>> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
>> =================
>>
>> When doing bitblt copy backwards, qemu should negate the blit width.
>> This avoids an oob access before the start of video memory.
>>
>> IMPACT
>> ======
>>
>> A malicious guest administrator can cause an out of bounds memory
>> access, possibly leading to information disclosure or privilege
>> escalation.
>>
>> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
>> ==================
>>
>> Versions of qemu shipped with all Xen versions are vulnerable.
>>
>> Xen systems running on x86 with HVM guests, with the qemu process
>> running in dom0 are vulnerable.
>>
>> Only guests provided with the "cirrus" emulated video card can exploit
>> the vulnerability.  The non-default "stdvga" emulated video card is
>> not vulnerable.  (With xl the emulated video card is controlled by the
>> "stdvga=" and "vga=" domain configuration options.)
>>
>> ARM systems are not vulnerable.  Systems using only PV guests are not
>> vulnerable.
>>
>> For VMs whose qemu process is running in a stub domain, a successful
>> attacker will only gain the privileges of that stubdom, which should
>> be only over the guest itself.
>>
>> Both upstream-based versions of qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen")
>> and `traditional' qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen-traditional")
>> are vulnerable.
>>
>> MITIGATION
>> ==========
>>
>> Running only PV guests will avoid the issue.
>>
>> Running HVM guests with the device model in a stubdomain will mitigate
>> the issue.
>>
>> Changing the video card emulation to stdvga (stdvga=1, vga="stdvga",
>> in the xl domain configuration) will avoid the vulnerability.
>>
>> RESOLUTION
>> ==========
>>
>> Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.
>>
>> xsa208-qemuu.patch    qemu-xen, mainline qemu
>
> The patch doesn't apply cleanly against the QEMU-upstream found in Xen 4.7.1:
>
> http://beefy9.nyi.freebsd.org/data/110amd64-default/433828/logs/xen-tools-4.7.1_2.log

I'm working on an updated advisory., but in the meantime, Stefano
checked in backported patches to the qemu-xen tree already; you can
get those from the staging-4.* branches.

(That doesn't address the qemu-traditional issues -- for those you'll
have to wait for the updated advisory.)

 -George

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