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Message-Id: <E1cdL8t-0007j3-EY@xenbits.xenproject.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 18:14:27 +0000
From: Xen.org security team <security@....org>
To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org,
xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org>
Subject: Xen Security Advisory 208 (CVE-2017-2615) - oob access in cirrus
bitblt copy
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Hash: SHA1
Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-2615 / XSA-208
version 2
oob access in cirrus bitblt copy
UPDATES IN VERSION 2
====================
Included backport for qemu-xen versions 4.7 (and earlier); fixed
qemu-xen-traditional patch. Also included proper (non-obscured)
e-mail addresses from upstream patch.
Removed "possibly" from Impact.
3 patches updated
ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================
When doing bitblt copy backwards, qemu should negate the blit width.
This avoids an oob access before the start of video memory.
IMPACT
======
A malicious guest administrator can cause an out of bounds memory
access, leading to information disclosure or privilege escalation.
VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================
Versions of qemu shipped with all Xen versions are vulnerable.
Xen systems running on x86 with HVM guests, with the qemu process
running in dom0 are vulnerable.
Only guests provided with the "cirrus" emulated video card can exploit
the vulnerability. The non-default "stdvga" emulated video card is
not vulnerable. (With xl the emulated video card is controlled by the
"stdvga=" and "vga=" domain configuration options.)
ARM systems are not vulnerable. Systems using only PV guests are not
vulnerable.
For VMs whose qemu process is running in a stub domain, a successful
attacker will only gain the privileges of that stubdom, which should
be only over the guest itself.
Both upstream-based versions of qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen")
and `traditional' qemu (device_model_version="qemu-xen-traditional")
are vulnerable.
MITIGATION
==========
Running only PV guests will avoid the issue.
Running HVM guests with the device model in a stubdomain will mitigate
the issue.
Changing the video card emulation to stdvga (stdvga=1, vga="stdvga",
in the xl domain configuration) will avoid the vulnerability.
RESOLUTION
==========
Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.
xsa208-qemuu.patch mainline qemu, qemu-xen master,4.8
xsa208-qemuu-4.7.patch qemu-xen 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7
xsa208-qemut.patch qemu-xen-traditional
$ sha256sum xsa208*
afde3e9d4bf5225f92c36dec9ff673b0b1b0bad4452d406f0c12edc85e2fec72 xsa208-qemut.patch
e492d528141be5899d46c2ac0bcd0c40ca9d9bfc40906a8e7a565361f17ce38d xsa208-qemuu.patch
09471b66c9d9fc5616e7b96ab67bbb51987e7d9520d1b81cb27cbbb168659ad5 xsa208-qemuu-4.7.patch
$
NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO
==============================
This issue has already been publicly disclosed.
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Download attachment "xsa208-qemut.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1919 bytes)
Download attachment "xsa208-qemuu.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1916 bytes)
Download attachment "xsa208-qemuu-4.7.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (1860 bytes)
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