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Message-ID: <20161110145424.GA18402@tunkki>
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2016 16:54:24 +0200
From: Henri Salo <henri@...v.fi>
To: cve-request@...re.org
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Egidio Romano <n0b0d13s@...il.com>
Subject: CVE request: Piwik <= 2.16.0 (saveLayout) PHP Object Injection
vulnerability
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Please assign CVE identifier for Piwik <= 2.16.0 (saveLayout) PHP Object
Injection vulnerability, thanks. For the previous request MITRE responded that
Piwik is out of scope, but there has been lots of CVEs assigned for Piwik so
could you please clarify for the oss-security mailing list why this one didn't
get assigned. At least following CVEs has been assigned before:
CVE-2011-0004, CVE-2011-0398, CVE-2011-0399, CVE-2011-0400, CVE-2011-0401
CVE-2011-4941, CVE-2012-4541, CVE-2013-0193, CVE-2013-0195, CVE-2013-1844
CVE-2013-2633, CVE-2015-7815, CVE-2015-7816
In case you are changing the policy for some software products about CVE
assignment what are the reasoning for this and where are these cases listed
publicly?
Details of the vulnerability below.
http://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2016-13
http://lists.openwall.net/full-disclosure/2016/11/07/13
"""
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
Piwik <= 2.16.0 (saveLayout) PHP Object Injection Vulnerability
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Software Link:
https://piwik.org/
[-] Affected Versions:
Version 2.16.0 and prior versions.
[-] Vulnerability Description:
The vulnerability can be triggered through the saveLayout() method
defined in /plugins/Dashboard/Controller.php:
210. public function saveLayout()
211. {
212. $this->checkTokenInUrl();
213.
214. $layout =
Common::unsanitizeInputValue(Common::getRequestVar('layout'));
215. $layout = strip_tags($layout);
216. $idDashboard = Common::getRequestVar('idDashboard', 1, 'int');
217. $name = Common::getRequestVar('name', '', 'string');
218.
219. if (Piwik::isUserIsAnonymous()) {
220. $session = new SessionNamespace("Dashboard");
221. $session->dashboardLayout = $layout;
222. $session->setExpirationSeconds(1800);
User input passed by anonymous users through the "layout" request
parameter is being stored into
a session variable at line 221, and this is possible by invoking an URL
like this:
http://[piwik]/index.php?module=Dashboard&action=saveLayout&token_auth=anonymous&layout=[injection]%26%2365536;
Since Piwik is not using "utf8mb4" collations for its database, this can
be exploited in combination with a MySQL
UTF8 truncation issue in order to corrupt the session array, allowing
unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary
PHP objects into the application scope and carry out Server-Side Request
Forgery (SSRF) attacks, delete arbitrary
files, execute arbitrary PHP code, and possibly other attacks.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability
requires Piwik to use the database to store session data (dbtable
option) and the application running on
PHP before version 5.4.45, 5.5.29, or 5.6.13.
[-] Solution:
Update to version 2.16.1 or later.
[-] Disclosure Timeline:
[08/02/2016] - Vendor notified
[09/02/2016] - Vendor replied not to be able to reproduce the issue
[11/02/2016] - Proof of concept tested on demo.piwik.org sent to the vendor
[11/02/2016] - Vendor response stating the issue will be fixed in 2.16.1
release
[17/02/2016] - Bug bounty received
[11/04/2016] - Version 2.16.1 released:
http://piwik.org/changelog/piwik-2-16-1/
[16/06/2016] - CVE number requested
[07/11/2016] - Public disclosure
[-] CVE Reference:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org)
has not assigned a CVE identifier for this vulnerability.
[-] Credits:
Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.
[-] Original Advisory:
http://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2016-13
"""
- --
Henri Salo
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