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Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 18:47:53 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <>
Subject: Re: CVE Request - multiple ghostscript -dSAFER
 sandbox problems

On Wed, 5 Oct 2016 09:13:03 -0700
Tavis Ormandy <> wrote:

> If you're using ImageMagick, I would recommend disabling the PS, EPS,
> PDF and XPS coders in policy.xml. Applications like gimp, evince,
> claws, and most other applications that generate thumbnails of PDF/PS
> documents should probably not do so without a prompt (NOTE: A lot of
> packages do this

I was surprised to see evince in this list. It uses poppler for pdf and
libspectre for postscript, so there seems to be no use of
ghostscript (maybe in an older version).
Also for claws the only use of ghostscript is in a plugin that's not
enabled by default.

While I agree that avoiding parsing for things like thumbnails should
be tried I still wonder what the overall solution to this is. Because
even if we avoid non-prompted ps parsing we still want to be able to
parse PS files without code execution.
Do you feel dSAFER could be secured or is this a loosing battle?

Hanno Böck

GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42

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