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Message-Id: <20160728210138.B68BC42E01D@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2016 17:01:38 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: ago@...too.org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: paps: heap overflow when processing crafted file

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Hash: SHA256

> it was discovered during fuzzing that a crafted file causes an heap overflow
> in paps ( https://sourceforge.net/projects/paps/ ).

We would need someone to contribute additional risk analysis before we
would assign a CVE ID. We realize that
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/07/28/paps-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-read_file-paps-c/
says "It provides both a stand alone command line tool as well as a
library." The https://sourceforge.net/p/paps/code/ci/master/tree/src/
code has the library (in libpaps.c) whereas the
https://github.com/dov/paps code does not. In any case,
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/07/28/paps-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-read_file-paps-c/
is about a buffer under-read in the read_file function, which is only
called from main (not called from any library code). Also, the patch
is apparently only about handling empty files, not about handling any
other type of crafted file. If the user runs the command-line program
on an empty file, a "heap-buffer-overflow ... READ of size 1" occurs
when trying to read the last character of the file to determine if
it's a \n character. To avoid this impact, the user can simply stop
running paps on empty files.

Because we don't see any other risk, we are not providing a CVE ID at
this time.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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