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Message-Id: <20160623125926.22C04B2E154@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 08:59:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: meissner@...e.de
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: Python HTTP header injection in urrlib2/urllib/httplib/http.client
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> https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=20018
When we looked at this last week, we concluded that it was intentional
glibc behavior and therefore a glibc CVE ID should not exist.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303699 Comment 4 is a
private comment, but there is apparently a copy of it in the public
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1347549 Comment 3:
This flexible behaviour is allowed because it makes parsing
space-separated lists of addresses (as C strings) easier to manage.
You advance the pointer between the address blocks and call
inet_aton. In this case getaddrinfo uses inet_aton to determine the
validity of the input string, and so considers "127.0.0.1\r\nspam"
a valid name parameter and it is immediately converted into the
address structure for 127.0.0.1.
The remaining concern is that there's a potentially important
enhancement to glibc in which functionality would be added that is
similar to the current inet_addr/inet_aton behavior but with
"127.0.0.1\r\nspam" rejected as an invalid address. The current
behavior possibly belongs on a list of glibc oddities but, we think,
not on the CVE list.
- --
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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