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Message-Id: <20160604145419.70E2B6C037C@smtpvmsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2016 10:54:19 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: sebastian@...ping.org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: expat hash collision fix too predictable?
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> Please confirm that using CVE-2012-6702 for consequences of
> "unanticipated internal calls to srand" is what you intended.
Yes, we confirm that. (They are unanticipated both because of
thread-safety concerns, and because it's possible for an application
to have an important dependency on srand being called exactly once.)
> The hash DoS vulnerability CVE-2012-0876 was fixed to some extend in
> Expat 2.1.0, commit e3e81a6d
> ...
> The next release of Expat will not do internal calls to srand (or rand)
> any more but extract and use entropy from other sources.
> ...
> I suppose hash initialization with (too little /) second-based
> entropy still is part of the original CVE-2012-0876 (or the same again).
Use CVE-2016-5300 for the separate issue in which the original choices
of entropy source and RNG did not properly address the possibility of
a successful hash DoS attack. In other words, the code changes (in the
next release) to fix CVE-2016-5300 are needed because the original fix
for CVE-2012-0876 was insufficient. (We use separate CVE IDs when
follow-on work is needed to complete the solution to the same original
vulnerability finding.)
- --
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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