|
Message-Id: <20160501140215.AED64332069@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org> Date: Sun, 1 May 2016 10:02:15 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: carnil@...ian.org Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: libpam-sshauth: local root privilege escalation -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > Due to a programming error, libpam-sshauth returned PAM_SUCCESS where > it should fail with PAM_AUTH_ERR. This was fixed in Debian in the last > upload to unstable with the attached patch. > > https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~ltsp-upstream/ltsp/libpam-sshauth/revision/114 We can assign a CVE ID because it appears that something definitely is wrong from the Debian perspective, either the code itself or documentation/lack-of-documentation about how the code was supposed to be used. Use CVE-2016-4422. However, we don't completely understand the issue: > Introduced with: > https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~ltsp-upstream/ltsp/libpam-sshauth/revision/93/src/pam_sshauth.c Here, the commit message for revision 93 was "Succeed for system accounts." We don't know why introducing the undocumented behavior of "Is it a system user? Fail" would be better than simply not checking "pwent->pw_uid < UID_MIN" at all. Also, is there any risk that, with this libpam-sshauth update, a system's PAM configuration might suddenly provide no way for root to login via SSH? Is it possible that the original motivation for revision 93 was that the PAM_SUCCESS from pam_sm_authenticate was supposed to be specially handled elsewhere in the "pwent->pw_uid < UID_MIN" case? Although not directly applicable to libpam-sshauth, the examples section of the http://www.linux-pam.org/Linux-PAM-html/sag-pam_succeed_if.html man page shows that a set of rules is sometimes designed with UID_MIN special cases. - -- CVE Assignment Team M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJXJgu2AAoJEHb/MwWLVhi2N9QP/ipqCwQfw26d7T8QCUYXXdu9 laDy1/2z/rzShOZ/nKrGNQHk/3opoik7FWDpYPDJbr367uZ8XF2I8KsiUAGAYiBb 3O3scUEvSPgUkj+5x/goeAXiLV5/q8QUg0OHigP0Gfpwv1CKAs6LAlQjt0Qaqxal A7eghcxIrOLQPnHNEC7DEegEZy/2A+fldzfGYimgHYylznUYnNSPl5iixxH2bj0+ v51pm0dF1SQUXDjkw0TDqu2TVXOAfOcJp/tC6LVDvFLLxHldkK+MvwkG1x3jI+77 U9MbskBP2TYzswJLwkx8shQWg1KKIpbNCjUOF7/58a8uTyGo2YbX24J0jWBRNoMR OyIrCUm3Ew7sAutg5y/13zaPwGMbKePXJDXxNrINNeASa8zlCsNdC1Q+oKXisYQw 48xPMceP2/0zuRqhBfiXqyOvRXEJWwCglOVC1dvxN1EhDN6Or5GP+alpDH9u2ynM iLqEsYI6IJ234tJIDWCPjVGB6BngaqBZ+bOPQz0qn6sgu85WFJ++uttfAjKYaKsm w0UZe6B/hP6dtkIvkfgi3tz61onRXUsalOXgYLdb8hKBWght7rzFgXjGzsbTFn+D WaKFixcCZCOwSLyEStYJRlM8WNIEZuygzX6tpXaqutt6L6Wi+EqjIZwrWqeT7ZL/ 1xxVfqFG6QX6ImFB4QNg =5EIr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.