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Message-Id: <20160331203125.94DE28BC0A1@smtpvmsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2016 16:31:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: Partial SMAP bypass on 64-bit Linux kernels
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?h=x86/urgent&id=3d44d51bd339766f0178f0cf2e8d048b4a4872aa
>
> That patch fixes a bug that exposed a fairly large kernel code surface
> to a straightforward SMAP bypass.
>> From: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@...ian.org>
>> Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 17:00:03 +0200
>> @MITRE CVE assignment team: Would it make sense to have a CVE id
>> assigned for this issue for better trackability?
We're going to approach this one in the same way as the issue that was
later assigned CVE-2016-2847.
Specifically, is there anyone who believes
3d44d51bd339766f0178f0cf2e8d048b4a4872aa must not have a CVE ID?
The situation, very roughly, seems to be that the upstream vendor has
announced that the behavior is a bug. CLAC occurs at a correct place
for some types of entries, but accidentally did not occur at a correct
place in the case of entries through the int80 gate. Consequently,
exploits of kernel vulnerabilities can cause more damage in some
cases.
However, it seems to be a bug in how the kernel responds to a
post-exploitation attack pattern. This is not a topic area that
commonly has CVE ID assignments. Access by the kernel to a user space
page is not an action that "crosses a privilege boundary" in a
traditional sense.
- --
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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