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Message-ID: <20160301175939.GA8873@gremlin.ru>
Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 20:59:39 +0300
From: gremlin@...mlin.ru
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE's for SSLv2 support
On 2016-03-01 10:33:17 -0700, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176
> TL;DR: SSLv2 needs to be shot.
Yes, with SSLv3 and TLS 1.0 being the next.
> Now we have yet another significant SSLv2 problem, DROWN, bad
> enough in fact that Red Hat has now disabled SSLv2 in OpenSSL
> by default (already done in NSS/GnuTLS), so from my vendor
> perspective, we're treating SSLv2 support as a security problem,
> the solution of which is to remove said support.
The problem is more wide, as it's in the use of insecure algorithms.
> But more generally, should we look at assigning CVE's for
> support of SSLv2, much like we would for products supporting
> DES or other known insecure cryptographic algorithms, hashes,
> digests and protocols? My personal vote is for yes.
Yes. Including, but not limited to:
1. RSA keys of less than 4096 bits (a minimum of 8192 should be
recommended).
2. Non-EC discrete logarithm based algos (DSA, old GOST 34.10-94).
2. EC-based algos with keys of less than 256 bits (as for me, I'd
consider 1024 bits to be an absolute minimum: chips are cheap, but
the energy is still expensive).
3. Symmetric ciphers in any mode other than CFB or counter-based.
4. Symmetric ciphers with key size of less than 256 bits.
5. Hash functions of less than 256 bits.
--
Alexey V. Vissarionov aka Gremlin from Kremlin
GPG: 8832FE9FA791F7968AC96E4E909DAC45EF3B1FA8
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