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Message-ID: <CANO=Ty3qgsHtaivrfwoB=ZdbgyE=z5+Q+HkhazE06ppDbw63RQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 10:33:17 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, CVE ID Requests <cve-assign@...re.org>
Subject: CVE's for SSLv2 support
So there is this proposed RFC:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176
TL;DR: SSLv2 needs to be shot.
Now we have yet another significant SSLv2 problem, DROWN, bad enough in
fact that Red Hat has now disabled SSLv2 in OpenSSL by default (already
done in NSS/GnuTLS), so from my vendor perspective, we're treating SSLv2
support as a security problem, the solution of which is to remove said
support.
But more generally, should we look at assigning CVE's for support of SSLv2,
much like we would for products supporting DES or other known insecure
cryptographic algorithms, hashes, digests and protocols? My personal vote
is for yes.
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert@...hat.com
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