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Message-Id: <20160218002253.DAAF452E03D@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 19:22:53 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: sinkmanu@...il.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, security@...ian.org
Subject: Re: CVE Request: graphite-web: open redirect
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> https://github.com/graphite-project/graphite-web/issues/1441
>
> two OpenRedirects in /webapp/graphite/account/views.py
>
> Proof of Concept:
> http://graphiteSite/account/logout?nextPage=https://www.google.com
Is there a response from the author of the code indicating that this
is a vulnerability? Open redirects to http/https are not universally
considered vulnerabilities for all vendors and products, e.g.,
https://sites.google.com/site/bughunteruniversity/nonvuln/open-redirect
is probably the most well-known counterargument.
> http://graphiteSite/account/update
> POST: nextPage=https://www.google.com
What is the threat model for this open redirect issue that requires a
POST request? Often, an attacker's ability to make a client submit a
POST request with an attacker-controlled parameter means that the
client is executing JavaScript code from an attacker-controlled site,
and in that case the JavaScript can send the browser to an arbitrary
http/https URL without any realistic ability of the client user to
predict that that might occur. Is there a way in which the existence
of http://graphiteSite/account/update helps the attacker to accomplish
the redirect?
> Also, inside the logout and update functions, the session should be checked.
What vulnerability are you reporting here? Are /account/logout and
/account/update vulnerable to CSRF?
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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