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Message-ID: <871tfxdgzw.fsf@lysator.liu.se>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 11:47:31 +0200
From: Leif Nixon <nixon@...ator.liu.se>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Qualys Security Advisory - CVE-2015-3245 userhelper - CVE-2015-3246 libuser
Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@...il.com> writes:
> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 3:43 AM, Leif Nixon <nixon@...ator.liu.se> wrote:
>> Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@...lys.com> writes:
>>
>>> Hello, it is July 23, 2015, 17:00 UTC, the Coordinated Release Date for
>>> CVE-2015-3245 and CVE-2015-3246. Please find our advisory below, and
>>> our exploit attached.
>>
>> *Why* are you releasing a full exploit just minutes after the patch is
>> released?
>>
>> (Disclosure: I am employed by Red Hat, but this is my purely personal question.)
>
> That's how coordinated release dates work. Instead of trying to shame
> Qualys for not following your arbitrary views on what is and isn't
> "Responsible Disclosure", perhaps you should make sure Red Hat
> releases patches hours before the CRD, like Ubuntu does?
Oh, hi there.
My views are not very arbitrary; rather they are based on years of
trying to defend big infrastructures.
As I see it, there are two reasons for releasing working exploits
without warning;
1) Forcing the hand of a non-responsive vendor,
2) Stroking a weak ego by showing off. (Or for marketing, but that comes
to the same thing.)
Except for case 1, releasing a working exploit *does not help anybody*
except the kiddies. If there are other reasons, I'd like to be told
about them.
If Qualys had released a slightly less detailed advisory, or even just
left off the actual exploit, and given users a day or two to patch their
systems before going full disclosure, the risk to innocent bystanders
would have been much reduced.
--
Leif Nixon
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