oss-security - Question about tmp flaws in non-default build options (e.g. Kerberos DEBUG

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Message-ID: <5564A227.3030608@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 10:41:11 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>,
        CVE ID Change <cve-id-change@...re.org>
Subject: Question about tmp flaws in non-default build options (e.g. Kerberos
 DEBUG_ASN1)

So I found some obvious tmp vulns in Kerberos, but they only exist if
you build with DEBUG_ASN1 on (and if you're in that situation you got
some not fun problems).

However based on the fact that CVE-2014-1692 (the OpenSSH J-PAKE
protocol) it seems that even if the code is not enabled by default, the
fact that it exists is enough to qualify it for a CVE. So with this in
mind I'm sending a CVE request in.

First example from each of the 3 files affected by the DEBUG_ASN1 tmp
file issues (note: print_buffer_bin doesn't do anything clever to be safe):

===================================================
./src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c
===================================================
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
    if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
        print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
                         "/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
    } else {
--


===================================================
./src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_srv.c
===================================================
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
    print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req");
#endif
--

=================================
./src/plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_clnt.c
=================================
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
    print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)coded_auth_pack->data,
                     coded_auth_pack->length,
                     "/tmp/client_auth_pack");
#endif
--




-- 
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993


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