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Message-ID: <1432152159.5007.10.camel@debian.org>
Date: Wed, 20 May 2015 22:02:39 +0200
From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2015-4000 - TLS does not properly convey
server's ciphersuite choice
On mer., 2015-05-20 at 14:29 -0400, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
> 1. Use of a common group obtained from a third party was not a
> choice that would have been anticipated to be unreasonable.
>
> 2. Avoiding use of a common group is not really equivalent to
> correcting a software mistake; it could typically involve improving a
> software product by adding new functionality or documentation, such as
> adding a call to "openssl dhparam" at installation time.
>
> 3. Existence of a common group across different customers' deployments
> of a product is not independently exploitable; there is no attack that
> depends exclusively on knowing the group used by a victim.
In some cases (IKEv2 for example), using different parameters is not
possible (or really unpractical): standards groups are defined in
RFC3526.
--
Yves-Alexis
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