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Message-ID: <5530B93A.5090701@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2015 09:41:46 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: kernel: fs.suid_dumpable=2 privilege escalation
On 04/16/2015 08:41 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:42 AM, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> wrote:
>> Should this be treated as a security vulnerability?
>>
>> “fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path”
>> <http://lwn.net/Articles/503682/>
>>
>> Some widely-used cronie versions still do not have hardening and parse
>> commands in core dumps.
>
> I didn't seek a CVE for this at the time since it requires a pretty
> specific combination of configurations. Namely: setting dumpable=2
> without a dump handler, which I couldn't find any distro doing. I have
> no objection, of course.
Ah, right. I noticed this while looking at the file-based coredump
emulation in abrt-hook-ccpp. It's not the default, either, so we have
not yet assigned a CVE, and we probably won't call it a vulnerability.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
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