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Message-ID: <550FC40B.1050808@openwall.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:43:07 +0300
From: Alexander Cherepanov <ch3root@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE for Kali Linux
On 23.03.2015 02:48, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Alexander Cherepanov <ch3root@...nwall.com> writes:
>
>> There are some attacks even if you verify signatures, e.g. serving old,
>> known-vulnerable versions. HTTPS can help here (until signatures start
>> to be widely accompanied by expiring timestamps or something).
>
> Debian is indeed moving in exactly that direction, using the Valid-Until
> attribute of the archive metadata. This currently isn't (yet?) enabled
> for the main stable archive, but is for the unstable and testing archives,
> the security archive, and the backports archive.
Yes, and Release file for stable includes Date header, which is good
enough for manual inspection. But cd images have only their SHA256SUMS
signed, right? This means that file names are signed too so an attacker
cannot substitute debian 7.7. for debian 7.8 but dates are harder to check.
--
Alexander Cherepanov
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