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Message-ID: <55097324.1070606@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 13:44:20 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, CVE-assign <cve-assign@...re.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Linux kernel execution in the early
microcode loader.
On 03/18/2015 01:25 PM, Quentin Casasnovas wrote:
> The attack vector could be from anyone between Intel and people
> shipping/packaging the microcode, or could potentially be used to get a
> resilient backdoor on system already compromised by sticking a tampered
> microcode on the initrd. It would also allow root to get kernel execution
> by recreating the initrd. I admit these are overly paranoid scenarios, but
> I _think_ there's still a privilege crossing from root to kernel exec which
> could make sense on certain security model.
Yes, Secure Boot separates root privileges from code execution in ring 0
(according to some interpretations of Secure Boot, in practice,
signatures on binaries allowing ring 0 code execution are not revoked,
so this new vulnerability does not alter the general picture).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
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