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Message-ID: <550845D3.1020509@tao.at>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 16:18:43 +0100
From: Sven Schwedas <sven.schwedas@....at>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Fwd: [ANNOUNCE] X.Org Security Advisory: More
BDF file parsing issues in libXfont
On 2015-03-17 16:11, Alan Coopersmith wrote:
>
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: [ANNOUNCE] X.Org Security Advisory: More BDF file parsing
> issues in libXfont
> Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 08:08:33 -0700
> From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@...cle.com>
> To: xorg-announce@...ts.x.org
> CC: William Robinet <william.robinet@...ostix.com>, xorg@...ts.x.org,
> xorg-devel@...ts.x.org, Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@...ctive.com>
>
> X.Org Security Advisory: March 17, 2015
> More BDF file parsing issues in libXfont
> ========================================
>
> Description:
> ============
>
> Ilja van Sprundel, a security researcher with IOActive, has discovered an
> issue in the parsing of BDF font files by libXfont. Additional testing by
> Alan Coopersmith and William Robinet with the American Fuzzy Lop (afl) tool
> uncovered two more issues in the parsing of BDF font files.
>
> As libXfont is used by the X server to read font files, and an unprivileged
> user with access to the X server can tell the X server to read a given font
> file from a path of their choosing, these vulnerabilities have the
> potential
Can this be exploited by any current browser's web fonts implementation,
or will this require local access? (Loading fonts from user-writeable
~/.fonts seems to be enabled by default.)
> to allow unprivileged users to run code with the privileges of the X server
> (often root access).
>
> The vulnerabilities are:
>
> - CVE-2015-1802: bdfReadProperties: property count needs range check
>
> The bdf parser reads a count for the number of properties defined in
> a font from the font file, and allocates arrays with entries for each
> property based on that count. It never checked to see if that count
> was negative, or large enough to overflow when multiplied by the size
> of the structures being allocated, and could thus allocate the wrong
> buffer size, leading to out of bounds writes.
>
> - CVE-2015-1803: bdfReadCharacters: bailout if a char's bitmap cannot be
> read
>
> If the bdf parser failed to parse the data for the bitmap for any
> character, it would proceed with an invalid pointer to the bitmap
> data and later crash when trying to read the bitmap from that pointer.
>
> - CVE-2015-1804: bdfReadCharacters: ensure metrics fit into xCharInfo
> struct
>
> The bdf parser read metrics values as 32-bit integers, but stored
> them into 16-bit integers. Overflows could occur in various operations
> leading to out-of-bounds memory access.
>
> Affected Versions
> =================
>
> X.Org believes all prior versions of this library contain these flaws,
> dating back to its introduction in X11R5.
>
>
> Fixes
> =====
>
> Fixes are available in the patches for these libXfont git commits:
> 2deda9906480f9c8ae07b8c2a5510cc7e4c59a8e
> 78c2e3d70d29698244f70164428bd2868c0ab34c
> 2351c83a77a478b49cba6beb2ad386835e264744
>
> Which are now available from:
> git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/xorg/lib/libXfont
> http://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/
>
> Fixes will also be included in the libXfont 1.5.1 & 1.4.9 module releases
> from X.Org.
>
> Thanks
> ======
>
> X.Org thanks Ilja van Sprundel of IOActive, Alan Coopersmith of Oracle, and
> William Robinet of Conostix for reporting these issues to our security team
> and helping evaluate and test the fixes; and thanks Michal Zalewski and the
> American Fuzzy Lop community for providing their fuzz testing tool as an
> open
> source project we can all benefit from at http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/ .
>
--
Mit freundlichen Grüßen, / Best Regards,
Sven Schwedas
Systemadministrator
TAO Beratungs- und Management GmbH | Lendplatz 45 | A - 8020 Graz
Mail/XMPP: sven.schwedas@....at | +43 (0)680 301 7167
http://software.tao.at
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