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Message-ID: <54F88D1E.1070200@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:06:38 +0000
From: John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Another Python app (rhn-setup: rhnreg_ks) not
checking hostnames in certs properly CVE-2015-1777
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On 04/03/15 18:37, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> On 04/03/15 11:14 AM, Donald Stufft wrote:
>> >
>>> >> On Mar 4, 2015, at 12:55 PM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1198740
>>> >>
>>> >> Jan Bee of the Google Security Team reports:
>>> >>
>>> >> The /usr/sbin/rhnreg_ks fails to properly validate hostnames in
>>> >> certificates. This can result in man in the middle attacks.
>>> >>
>>> >> ===
>>> >>
>>> >> Please note that this issue cannot easily be exploited to cause any
>>> >> significant damage to a system other then preventing registration from
>>> >> taking place properly which the attacker would be able to do in any
>>> >> event if the can man in the middle the connection.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> --
>>> >> Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
>>> >> PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
>>> >>
>> >
>> > Note: Python 2.7.9+ and 3.4.3+ will cause most apps like this to
>> > automatically start validating hostnames. It may be easier to backport
>> > those changes than to find every Python app that doesn’t check hostnames.
> Yup, I am aware of that, but as you know Red Hat is pretty conservative
> on updates to things like Python/etc because we have to support customer
> applications that we have never seen and will never see (e.g. internal
> corp software), and if we break those apps due to changes in underlying
> languages there is a big problem.
>
PEP 476 cites 11 CVEs that resulted from python not properly validating
certificates. This would be number 12.
Shouldn't python versions prior to 2.7.9 and 3.4.3 have a CVE each for
the lack of verification? If internal corporate software stops working
because of invalid certificates, wasn't it broken anyway?
jch
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