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Message-ID: <CACYkhxioBj+oaOG_amxfGSiDCNVjJBj-MZfjkbkk9nRsbma5fQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 10:09:22 +1100
From: Michael Samuel <mik@...net.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Another Python app (rhn-setup: rhnreg_ks) not
checking hostnames in certs properly CVE-2015-1777
Could RedHat ship a new package that replaced python's default SSL
library with the one that validates TLS by default and release a RHEA?
That way customers (like me) who never want broken TLS on their
network can just install a package and it's fixed.
Regards,
Michael
On 6 March 2015 at 05:36, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 05/03/15 10:06 AM, John Haxby wrote:
>> PEP 476 cites 11 CVEs that resulted from python not properly validating
>> certificates. This would be number 12.
>>
>> Shouldn't python versions prior to 2.7.9 and 3.4.3 have a CVE each for
>> the lack of verification? If internal corporate software stops working
>> because of invalid certificates, wasn't it broken anyway?
>
> So if something is advertised as having a security feature and does not
> or it is broken then it gets a CVE. In this case Python, and basically
> every other SSL/TLS implementation on the planet, by default, did not
> check hostnames in certs, but they did provide that capability should
> you choose to use it. So no CVE since it wasn't "meant to be secure" as
> I understand it.
>
> Now for my personal opinion: Doing SSL/TLS with server certs and not
> checking the hostname in a server cert is completely insane and utterly
> defeats the purpose. However there are cases where a certificate may not
> have a hostname field, or need a valid hostname field, e.g. a client
> certificate where you mostly care about the fact that the client has it
> at all. So I can see why they made hostname checks optional, but again,
> I think it was a very bad decision long term as evidenced by:
>
> http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=certificate+hostname+check
>
>> jch
>>
>
> --
> Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
> PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
>
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