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Message-Id: <201502200630.49887.tmb@65535.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2015 06:30:41 +0000
From: Tim Brown <tmb@...35.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Paul Pluzhnikov <ppluzhnikov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: Fixing the glibc runtime linker
On Friday 20 February 2015 01:38:31 Paul Pluzhnikov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 2:19 PM, Tim Brown <tmb@...35.com> wrote:
> > More often than not, the underlying issue is an empty element within the
> > DT_RPATH header or equivalent. Sometimes it's not, but even in those
> > cases, it is largely that one or more elements isn't qualifed (i.e. it
> > doesn't start with /). The attached patch fixes this, by ignoring any
> > elements of DT_RPATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH that do not start with a /, and/or
> > junking any use of dlopen where the filename is likewise unqualified.
> >
> > Won't this break stuff?
>
> FWIW, relative RPATHs are quite fundamental to our test execution
> environment, and any patch that unconditionally ignores them would
> have to be reverted in our tree.
That's useful to know. Is that for setuid binaries or more generally? As I
noted, it would be dead easy only to use the part of the patch that rejects
them for the former only. Although as I said, that offers less protection.
Would that make the patch more consumable? Another option would be to have
something like /etc/suid-debug which could flag that an override is in
operation.
> Also, don't you want to discuss this on libc-alpha? oss-security could
> be all for it, but without buy-in from libc-alpha your patch is
> unlikely to be going anywhere.
I'm intending to, but getting security folk, who may well wear slightly more
positive hats to begin with, to review it, seemed like a safe place to start.
I can well imagine pursuading the glibc folk will be more difficult :/.
Tim
--
Tim Brown
<mailto:tmb@...35.com>
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