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Message-ID: <54C014E8.9050703@pipping.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2015 22:06:48 +0100
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@...ping.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE or not: 2x grml-debootstrap

Hi!


TLDR:
* One or two CVE candidates
* Review of proposed fixes wanted
* Ideas on realistic attack scenarios welcome


grml-debootstrap [1] is a wrapper around debootstrap written in Bash.


I recently ran into two bugs in grml-debootstrap, documented in detail
at the following GitHub issues.


1) For the first

  Issues with sourcing cmdlineopts.clp from current working directory
  https://github.com/grml/grml-debootstrap/issues/59

I am rather clear about exploitability.
Please review the proposed approach for a fix.


2) For the second

  Lack of user input escaping / use of $!`"\ in passwords
  https://github.com/grml/grml-debootstrap/issues/58

I still wonder about realistic exploitation scenarios.  Since the tool
is usually executed by root or using sudo, input from a non-root user
would need to make its way into the command line, unfiltered or filtered
insufficiently.  It could either be a service like

  live-build
  http://cgi.build.live-systems.org/cgi-bin/live-build

(they don't call grml-debootstrap, if the code is [2])
or a sudoers config like

  user23 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/grml-debootstrap \
    --password * .....

though I am note sure how much of a likely setup that is.

Other ideas on scenarios?
Also, please review my proposal on escaping.

Thanks and best,



Sebastian


[1] https://github.com/grml/grml-debootstrap
[2] https://packages.debian.org/de/wheezy/live-build

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