[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <54804D3B.2090306@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2014 13:02:03 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: procmail heap overflow in getlline()
On 12/04/2014 11:26 AM, Martino Dell'Ambrogio wrote:
> For what is worth, I strongly believe this is a security bug for the
> same reason.
> As soon as there is an undocumented way to execute code, it will be
> impossible for a .procmailrc file generator to avoid execution of code.
> Workaround measures like security capabilities can not be taken into
> account as they are not implicit.
There are many documented code execution opportunities (some of them
still rather subtle), so I find any arguments based on the existence of
a hypothetical secure procmailrc file generator not very convincing.
:0
|echo code execution >/dev/tty
:0
* ?echo code execution >/dev/tty
/dev/null
… and so on.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
