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Message-ID: <545CC7EB.4000903@internot.info>
Date: Sat, 08 Nov 2014 00:23:55 +1100
From: Joshua Rogers <oss@...ernot.info>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE-Request: dpkg handling of 'control' and
warnings format string vulnerability
On 08/11/14 00:14, Sven Kieske wrote:
> to quote the man page of dpkg:
>
>> --no-act, --dry-run, --simulate Do everything which is supposed to
>> be done, but don't write any changes. This is used to see what
>> would happen with the specified action, without actually modifying
>> anything.
> So the users assumes this does not "modify anything"
> and if I understood this bug correct this gives at least
> access to the stack and allows to write/read memory.
Yes, you understood the bug correctly.
In reality, the vuln/bug is not a huge one. People _normally_ download
.deb files to install them.
But in some cases, that isn't always true.
If the bug was triggered before apt's signature handling, then it could
be a huge one. But it isn't(I'm guessing...)
And as I said, what if another program that, for example, integrates
with a browser, uses dpkg to analyze the .deb file.
The bug itself isn't confined to the -i flag either. It's in the
handling of the warnings. i.e very easy to trigger.
I'm taking a guess here, and going to say that there are other ways of
passing arbitrary strings to the warning function. I may be wrong though.
Thanks,
--
-- Joshua Rogers <https://internot.info/>
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