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Message-ID: <CAFRnB2VZkhKRJK7iKaGPA6hk8SVuqxt9KWGmjmL2xs66wZa6qA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2014 04:45:46 +0000
From: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: is MD5 finally dead?
As far as I can tell, HMAC doesn't actually require pre-image resistance,
it requires that the compression function used by the has be a PRF -- or at
least that's what the HMAC paper says. Are these two formulations
equivalent?
Alex
On Wed Nov 05 2014 at 8:42:59 PM Michael Samuel <mik@...net.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 5 November 2014 15:21, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote:
> > http://natmchugh.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/how-i-created-two-
> images-with-same-md5.html
> >
> > It seems like MD5 should probably be classed with DES as instant CVE
> > win, either now, or pretty soon....
>
> This is the same chosen-prefix attack that was used to forge
> certificates. Using md5 in
> a collision-hostile environment is definitely CVE worthy, and has been
> for a while. (BTW,
> no CVE for rsync yet)
>
> In the case of an unknown-prefix, HMAC[1] or anything requiring a
> preimage, it's
> just hardening to use swap out MD5 (and SHA-1).
>
> [1] Unless you accidentally swap the key and data fields!
>
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