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Message-ID: <5450422D.1020303@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 19:26:05 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: list policy (Re: Truly scary SSL 3.0 vuln to be
revealed soon:)
On 28/10/14 06:48 PM, Alexander Cherepanov wrote:
> On 2014-10-29 02:47, Kurt Seifried wrote:
>> On 28/10/14 07:47 AM, Alexander Cherepanov wrote:
>>> On 2014-10-15 12:30, Solar Designer wrote:
>>>> - Please don't send fully working exploits (but testcases that exercise
>>>> the flaw are welcome)
>>>>
>>>> FWIW, I've always been tempted to remove the latter guideline,
>>>
>>> Then perhaps just remove it? It always seemed to me a strange
>>> restriction. Other guidelines are either technical in nature or they are
>>> intended to reduce the amount of noise. This restriction seems to be
>>> neither.
>>>
>>> Of you can replace it with something like this:
>>> - Please only send fully working exploits which themselves are
>>> open-source.
>>>
>> Will someone/people vet the exploits to make sure they are not trojan
>> horses/self harming (e.g. the rm -rf * embedded in it somewhere?).
>> Strikes me as a heck of a watering hole attack potentially (and yes,
>> list members should know better, but ... yeah).
>
> This is an interesting question but how "fully working exploits" differ
> from "testcases that exercise the flaw" in this regard?
For example using something like metasploit the code would (in theory)
be more radable and anything hidden/obfuscated would stick out. My vote
would be to require well written nmap scripts or metasploit modules that
don't contain obfuscated code/etc. This would also make getting them to
work simpler (no use of weird one off CPAN modules or specific versions
of some obscure python thing, etc.).
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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