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Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 17:28:56 +0100
From: Vitor Ventura <>
Subject: Re: Connected UDP sockets and kernel queuing (CVE-2014-6512)


  I was thinking if this might open a door for a reflected amplification
attack. By your description this shouldn't be possible because the
application shouldn't be waiting for any packets after the close of he
socket, nevertheless a possible vector of attack seems to be open.
The attack vector could be achieved by the creation of a "connection" and
closure by a side channel and then exploit the time window created. These
side channels are common on gaming servers and streaming.

  I will try to test it.
Em 17/10/2014 16:03, "Florian Weimer" <> escreveu:

> I noticed a potential issue with connected UDP sockets and the kernel
> kernel per-socket packet queue, potentially leading to IP spoofing
> vulnerabilities in the sense that the application thinks the packet came
> from host A, but it really came from host B:
>   <>
> OpenJDK is particularly exposed because DatagramSocket.disconnect() calls
> connect(2) with AF_UNSPEC (or a NULL socket address on some systems) to
> disconnect sockets, which is a rarely used feature of the BSD sockets API.
> OpenJDK ensures that these disconnected sockets remain bound to a port, so
> it was possible to enqueue packets whose source address will not be
> checked, without even having a tight race to win.
> We thought briefly about fixing this in the kernel, but thought better of
> it because of backwards compatibility concerns (and we would have to patch
> OpenJDK nevertheless).  The OpenJDK fix simply checks the source address of
> incoming packets.  Oracle's fix has an optimization that drops this
> additional filter after the maximum amount of pending packets has been
> consumed from the socket; my patch moved the filter to native code instead
> and applied it to every packet on a connected socket.  I think both
> approaches are valid.
> I'm sharing this with a wider audience because in theory, other UDP-based
> services could be affected, although I didn't spot any when I looked at
> this prior to disclosure.
> --
> Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security

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