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Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 13:45:16 -0700
From: Michal Zalewski <>
To: oss-security <>
Subject: Re: attacking hsts through ntp

> The reason: HSTS preloaded sites are handled exactly the same way as
> normal HSTS sites - they can expire.

I haven't looked at the actual code, but Adam Langley said this on
another mailing list:

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Adam Langley <>
Date: Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 9:01 AM
Subject: Re: NTP vs. HSTS
To: Anne van Kesteren <>
Cc: John Kemp <>, ""

On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:11 AM, Anne van Kesteren <> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 5:01 PM, John Kemp <> wrote:
> So the problem is that time synchronization does not happen over TLS.
> That seems like a pretty big flaw in OSs. Hopefully someone audits any
> other unauthenticated channels they may have.

This is the motivation for things like tlsdate
( as used in parts of ChromeOS.

However, in section seven, where the author claims that preloaded
entries are added for 1000 days, that's only via the net-internals
debugging interface. (The code screenshot shown is also of code for
that debugging interface.) I believe that preloaded entries in Chrome
will always be enforced, no matter what the system time is.



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