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Message-ID: <04fd01cfdd69$57b26f50$07174df0$@jang@lge.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 20:17:52 +0900
From: "jihyun.jang" <jihyun.jang@....com>
To: <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: RE: binary-patching bash
Could you remove me in this mail list ? oss-security
-----Original Message-----
From: Solar Designer [mailto:solar@...nwall.com]
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 5:41 PM
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Chester Ramey; Antti Louko
Subject: Re: [oss-security] binary-patching bash
On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 04:44:05AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> I've just tweeted some crazy stuff, and it is even crazier to talk about
> this on a mailing list focused on Open Source, but ...
>
> <solardiz> cp -ip bash{,~} && env - perl -pe 's/\((\) {\0)/\0\1/g' bash >
bash~ && test `cmp -l bash{,~} | wc -l` = 1 && ln bash{,-} && mv -v bash{~,}
I just did a Google web search for "bash binary patch" and found (on
page 2 of search results) that this very approach had been suggested
before, by Antti Louko:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/nasty_vulnerabi.html#c6679473
| alo September 25, 2014 5:41 PM
|
| It is actually quite easy to binary patch bash. Open bash with eg. emacs
| and search for string "() {" and replace "(" with a null character. This
| disables the horrible "function definition from the environment" feature
| altogether.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/nasty_vulnerabi.html#c6679613
| alo September 27, 2014 7:06 AM
|
| As I wrote earlier, simple binary patch removes whole "automagic
| function definitions from the environment". I made a simple Python
| script to make the patch. It simply finds null-ending string "() {" and
| writes null over first "(".
|
| The script assumes that the first occurrence is the correct one. At
| least bash shells I have, that is the only and correct one. This can be
| also used to disable the feature in already patched vendor supplied bash
| binaries.
No analysis as to why this patch works was included in the comments,
though. Also, patching the first occurrence is riskier than making sure
there's exactly one occurrence, as my one-liner does. (For extra
safety, my one-liner can be further improved to check the actual output
from "cmp -l" with e.g. "egrep -c ' 50[[:space:]]+0$'" in place of
"wc -l", but that didn't fit in the tweet and is less portable.)
The Python script is:
http://alo.fi/bash/Patch-bash.py
SHA-256 of Patch-bash.py above as of the time of this writing:
4de321a4fb8c1787f983b754d434c1dde6fe58e3c76f2f6b3b77f10a3d0ea171
Patch-bash.py
Antti, you could want to enhance the Python script with an "exactly one
match" check, and post the new SHA-256 in here. While not tweetable, I
do see some advantage in this being written in just one language, as
opposed to my mix of shell and Perl.
I thought of doing the same in Perl or sed alone, and it'd fit in a
tweet easily (e.g., using "perl -pi.orig -e"), but not with the kind of
safety I wanted to include - the "exactly one match" check, and creating
a backup and updating bash atomically ("perl -i" unfortunately writes
over the file, so it'd bump into "Text file busy" or have bash broken
for new invocations for a while, and would keep bash broken if patching
fails). Hence the mix.
> <solardiz> Previous tweet disables function imports in bash due to
strncmp(..., 4). Tested on some Linux & FreeBSD, from bash & csh. At your
own risk.
> <solardiz> perl -pe 's/\(\) {\0/(){\0\0/g' followed by an "exactly one
match" check may be safer e.g. for an Internet-wide scan^Wpatch. ;-)
#shellshock
> <solardiz> bash 1.14.7 and bash 4.3 (and all inbetween?) use STREQN ("()
{", string, 4) and define STREQN via strncmp(). Allows portable binary
patch.
>
> The idea is that the length 4 STREQN() aka !strncmp() when invoked on a
> shorter constant string will require that the entire env var value be
> that string - that is, either empty (in my first tweet above) or a
> 3-char string (in my third tweet above). Neither case leaves any room
> for an attacker to provide arbitrary input to the parser via the former
> function imports feature.
>
> This dirty hack may be handy for patching otherwise unmaintained systems.
>
> The primary risk I see here is that some build of bash might include
> custom patches where this check had been changed to use something other
> than (an equivalent of) strncmp(). I am not aware of any such cases.
>
> Here's how to test that the feature is indeed disabled (or at least
> broken, although that is an insufficient test for security). Before the
> binary patch:
>
> $ testfunc() { echo test; }
> $ export -f testfunc
> $ bash -c testfunc
> test
>
> After the binary patch (first tweet):
>
> $ testfunc() { echo test; }
> $ export -f testfunc
> $ bash -c testfunc
> bash: testfunc: command not found
Alexander
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