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Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 15:10:23 +0200
From: Sebastian Krahmer <>
Subject: Re: Healing the bash fork

On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 01:50:40PM +0100, Mark R Bannister wrote:
> > I discuss the setuid/setgid vulnerability at the following site,> including demonstrating how Florian's prefix/suffix patch provides
> > no protection:>
> >
> Please can we have a separate CVE for the setuid/setgid bash exploit?  I think this attack vector deserves to be tracked properly, and we need to be clear on when and if someone chooses to provide a fix for it.

"innocuous looking setuid program" made my day ;)

We should take care not to blame all and everything to bash.



~ perl
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
~ - SuSE Security Team

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