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Message-ID: <CA+YQQ6XvvScCsvtCp5iHfrBUY6ENEqxW1MHyOxoFHGk8hp_JWw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 10:49:22 -0700
From: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...xchg8b.com>
To: "Kobrin, Eric" <ekobrin@...mai.com>
Cc: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"chet.ramey@...e.edu" <chet.ramey@...e.edu>, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>,
Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
Subject: Re: Healing the bash fork
On 29 September 2014 10:39, Kobrin, Eric <ekobrin@...mai.com> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 2014, at 11:59 AM, Eric Blake <eblake@...hat.com> wrote:
>
>> But I see no reason to move away from %% suffixing.
>
> The suffix fixes the obvious CGI hole, but it leaves exposed programs in which the adversary gets to choose the variable name as well.
>
> env $'BASH_FUNC_foo%%=() { echo 123\n }' bash -c "foo"
>
> I think that a more robust solution, such using a separate store for functions, is needed if function import is to survive as a feature.
>
> -- Eric Kobrin
If an adversary can choose the variable name, it's game over by
definition. He can choose LD_PRELOAD, SHELLOPTS='xtrace' PS4='$(foo)',
LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT, PYTHONINSPECT, etc, etc.
This general solution is robust, now we're just hammering out the details.
--
-------------------------------------
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