Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <87vbp7m5ph.fsf@vigenere.g10code.de>
Date: Mon, 01 Sep 2014 22:44:10 +0200
From: Werner Koch <wk@...pg.org>
To: Kristian Fiskerstrand <kristian.fiskerstrand@...ptuouscapital.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,  pkg-gnupg-maint@...ts.alioth.debian.org
Subject: Re: gpg blindly imports keys from keyserver responses

On Mon,  1 Sep 2014 20:41, kristian.fiskerstrand@...ptuouscapital.com
said:

> My personal opinion is this is expected behavior as the keyservers are
> not trusted, and as you point out above, there are proper measures

I fully agree with your opinion.  If we would have rejected the patch we
would not have run into this mess.  I agreed to add the patch because it
won't harm and had to find out that it costed me about 3 days to get the
regressions fixed :-(.  And now theses funny complaints that it is
unsafe to import arbitrary keys.

I recall mail clients which always imported attached keys - not a bad
thing.  S/MIME works the same.  One could debate whether such
automatically imported keys may eventuallt expire from the keyring but
this is orthogonal to the issues at hand.

*gpgv* is the tool to verify signatures using a well defined set of
keys.  It has been written exactly for that purpose.  *gpg* requires
that you use one of the available trust models - presence of a key in
the keyring is not such a model.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.