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Message-ID: <20140803055144.GB29958@gremlin.ru>
Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2014 09:51:44 +0400
From: gremlin@...mlin.ru
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Enforce use of HTTPS for MathJax in IPython
On 02-Aug-2014 16:31:17 -0400, Donald Stufft wrote:
>>> loaded over HTTP. An attacker with fortuitous network position
>>> could execute code on a local IPython notebook by modifying
>>> the mathjax javascript.
>> HTTPS wouldn't help much: the attackers (most of which are known
>> to use 3-letter names) can (and they really do) issue a fake
>> certificate for their decoy servers.
> There are attackers other than 3 letter agencies.
Those attackers don't have things like SORM-2 or Jindun Gongcheng.
>> In general, nothing received from the Net could be trusted. And
>> the HTTPS doesn't guarantee anything beyond "this certificate
>> was signed by this CA" - was that voluntary or forced.
Any objections on this point? :-)
>> Enforcing HTTPS for the whole site is even more stupid: normally
>> only user-specific data (login procedure, personal settings for
>> registered users, etc) should be forced to go through HTTPS;
>> everything else should normally be left up to the users' wish.
> This is incredibly wrong. First off if only your login procedures,
> personal settings, etc are password protected
Why password? Use client certificates instead.
> then it's trivial for a MITM to simply strip the HTTPS from the
> link to the login page.
At which point? Inside of my browser? Bwa-ha-ha...
Redirect from http://example.net/login to https://example.net/login
will perform just fine when there's a mistype.
> The vast bulk of users simply won't notice that they are visiting
> a page via HTTP instead of HTTPS.
Nothing new: 95% of people are morons.
But once you'll create a system which can be used even by morons,
it will be used only by morons.
> Furthermore, even if you manage to login over HTTPS, HTTP,
> being a stateless protocol, includes authentication credentials
> with every request. This is typically taken in the form of
> cookies which are sent with every request.
If you want to get some real security, use client certificates.
> In order to protect these cookies they need to only be sent
> over a HTTPS connection.
"This is incredibly wrong." // (q) Donald Stufft, 2014-08-02
Here's my cookie named "auth":
d4791d97c2e8aebfb09b0ce1e5d5bcc998fcdc02a2d4d7a5f7669c01d28fac5b
It is known to contain my IPv4 address (among other information)
and be Blowfish-encrypted. You've intercepted it. Next action?
Another option: I browse online shop anonymously (without logging
in, which is wise: I don't want to see offers on things I don't
actually need). You've intercepted my cookies. Next action?
> [...]
> So sure, this doesn't prevent a TLA with access to a root key
> doing a targeted attack against a site, however it does prevent
> an attacker who just happens to be on the same network (Coffeshop
> Wifi etc) from attacking you.
Unlike TLA, an attacker in the same network can only eavesdrop
passively. So, I can either keep anonimity (without logging in) or
switch to HTTPS intentionally. Just don't push me there unless I've
logged in...
(Normally I use secure tunnel to the trusted server when using public
hotspots, so this is just to keep the discussion).
>> But the terminal state of mental disability is... yes, using
>> scripts from outer sources: intercepting one popular source like
>> https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/*/jquery.min.js
>> will allow the attacker to not bother of intercepting other
>> sites directly.
Any comments on this?
--
Alexey V. Vissarionov aka Gremlin from Kremlin <gremlin ПРИ gremlin ТЧК ru>
GPG: 8832FE9FA791F7968AC96E4E909DAC45EF3B1FA8 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net
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