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Message-ID: <20140707120556.GB7007@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2014 14:05:56 +0200
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: default cipher suites in curl
On Mon, Jul 07, 2014 at 12:46:42PM +1000, Michael Samuel wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 2 July 2014 01:44, Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de> wrote:
> > Clients using the library could however set ciphers via
> > an option, but as it would work without, they might not have.
>
> This will only happen when the server either doesn't support stronger
> ciphers or when the server requests it's cipher order be honoured and
> chooses export ciphers first. An attacker can't trigger this with SSLv3
> or TLS.
I was more thinking of a man in the middle attack during the connection
setup.
> > Should it get a CVE?
>
> If a weak cipher was negotiated, it's because the server preferred this and
> the client didn't care. There's no trust boundary crossed.
" ... and the client did not care" is I think the point here.
curl in that form would accept all weak ciphers.
> An argument could be made that the clients would rather not establish a
> connection at all than negotiate a weak cipher. Not sure if that counts for
> CVE or just hardening?
Thats my question here :)
> Either way, this is a workaround for an OpenSSL bug.
Ciao, Marcus
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