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Message-ID: <20140619134025.GE7873@ubuntumail>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 13:40:25 +0000
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: docker VMM breakout
Quoting gremlin@...mlin.ru (gremlin@...mlin.ru):
> On 18-Jun-2014 10:05:35 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>
> > CONTAINERS DO NOT CONTAIN. Root inside the container == Root
> > outside the container.
>
> Really? :-)
>
> > This is true in both libvirt-sandbox/libvirt-lxc and docker.
>
> Have you checked that for anything else?
>
> > We have a long way to go before we can run anything within a
> > container without this rule. User Namespace, SELinux or other
> > MAC are all required to get us near the point where Container
> > Contain.
>
> Have you ever seen OpenVZ?
>
> > People who run services within a container should continue to
> > drop privs in the services and run them as UID!=0
>
> Look at this trivial code example...
>
> Classic kernel:
>
> if (!uid)
> {
> // perform privileged operation here
> }
>
> Containers-enabled kernel:
>
> if ( !uid && !container_id ) // container_id: 0 for host
> {
> // perform privileged operation here
> }
>
> How would you bypass this check to get privileged access to anything
> outside the container?
This isn't a privileged operation. It's simply reading a file
owned by your same userid.
What's happening is: mounts namespaces and pivot_root are used to
prevent tasks in the container from finding a name for the host's
/etc/shadow; but open_by_handle_at() is bypassing the mounts
namespaces and looking at the filesystem data itself. So there are
many ways to mitigate this - use seccomp to prevent open_by_handle_at(),
drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, make sure (haha) that not a single file
accessible in the container comes from the host's rootfs, use
user namespaces, use selinux to prevent the container from reading
any of the host-only labeled files. But your example above in fact
is not one.
-serge
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