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Message-Id: <E1WsBVA-0008GF-7u@xenbits.xen.org>
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 13:45:12 +0000
From: Xen.org security team <security@....org>
To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org,
xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org>
Subject: Xen Security Advisory 98 - insufficient permissions checks
accessing guest memory on ARM
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Xen Security Advisory XSA-98
version 2
insufficient permissions checks accessing guest memory on ARM
UPDATES IN VERSION 2
====================
Public release.
ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================
When accessing guest memory Xen does not correctly perform permissions
checks on the (possibly guest provided) virtual address: it only
checks that the mapping is readable by the guest, even when writing on
behalf of the guest. This allows a guest to write to memory which
it should only be able to read.
A guest running on a vulnerable system is able to write to memory
which should be read-only. This includes supposedly read only foreign
mappings established using the grant table mechanism. Such read-only
mappings are commonly used as part of the paravirtualised I/O drivers
(such as guest disk write and network transmit).
In order to exploit this vulnerability the guest must have a mapping
of the memory; it does not allow access to arbitrary addresses.
In the event that a guest executes code from a page which has been
shared read-only with another guest it would be possible to mount a
take over attack on that guest.
IMPACT
======
A domain which is deliberately exchanging data with another,
malicious, domain, may be vulnerable to privilege escalation. The
vulnerability depends on the precise behaviour of the victim domain.
In a typical configuration this means that, depending on the behaviour
of the toolstack or device driver domain, a malicious guest
administrator might be able to escalate their privilege to that of the
whole host.
VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================
Both 32- and 64-bit ARM systems are vulnerable from Xen 4.4 onward.
MITIGATION
==========
None.
CREDITS
=======
This issue was discovered by Julien Grall.
RESOLUTION
==========
Applying the appropriate pair of attached patches resolves this issue.
xsa98-unstable-{01,02}.patch xen-unstable
xsa98-4.4-{01,02}.patch Xen 4.4.x
$ sha256sum xsa98*.patch
6f63bc2e0a0a39bbd9137513a5d130ae2c78d1fd2ebf9172bf49456f73f0a67b xsa98-4.4-01.patch
b338472ecce3c31a55d1a936eebbd4e46cb3ad989b91a64d4b8c5d3ca80d875d xsa98-4.4-02.patch
b8535aad5ae969675d59781a81ce0b24491f1abc01aaf36c3620fd7fb6cc84eb xsa98-unstable-01.patch
f5e8a93525a8905653da6377097f77681ff8121b973063ff6081e27547ceaa67 xsa98-unstable-02.patch
$
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Download attachment "xsa98-4.4-01.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (5699 bytes)
Download attachment "xsa98-4.4-02.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (7800 bytes)
Download attachment "xsa98-unstable-01.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (5701 bytes)
Download attachment "xsa98-unstable-02.patch" of type "application/octet-stream" (7913 bytes)
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