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Message-ID: <20140603153726.GU23760@sentinelchicken.org> Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2014 08:37:26 -0700 From: Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org> To: David Jorm <djorm@...hat.com> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE-2014-0191 libxml2: external parameter entity loaded when entity substitution is disabled Hi David, > Sorry for the absurdly late reply to this thread. I finally found time to do > some testing on OpenJDK 1.7.0_45. I can confirm Tomas' assessment that > setExpandEntityReferences() and > setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true) have no bearing on > whether or not entity references are expanded, nor do they purport > to. Yeah, you gotta love FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING. It's just like calling a website "secure" because it uses SSL. I agree that these features don't purport to turn off certain dangerous features, but to a developer who doesn't know what parameter entities are, they could very easily assume they are safe with setExpandEntityReferences(false). > Applications that process attacker-supplied XML using Xerces are vulnerable > to SSRF attacks unless they use both > setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false) > and setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", > false). > > The OWASP XXE document should be updated to mention > external-parameter-entities. I will do this as soon as my OWASP wiki account > is approved. Feel free to use this as a reference for other thoughts on what developers should be wary of: http://vsecurity.com/download/papers/XMLDTDEntityAttacks.pdf I would also be interested to hear if you think anything I mention in there is inaccurate. Cheers, tim
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