[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20140528220355.GA7588@kroah.com>
Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 15:03:55 -0700
From: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: Linux kernel DoS with syscall
auditing
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 02:51:16PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 02:45:59PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> Issuing a system call with a random large number will OOPS, depending
> >> on configuration. A configuration that will enable this bug is:
> >>
> >> # auditctl -a exit,always -S open
> >>
> >> No privilege whatsoever is required to trigger the OOPS.
> >>
> >> It's possible that this can be extended to more than just a DoS --
> >> with some care and willingness to exploit timing attacks, this is a
> >> read of arbitrary single bits in kernel memory.
> >
> > Is there a kernel fix for this anywhere?
>
> No, but there will be soon.
Great, I see the thread on lkml now, thanks for the heads up.
> The correct fix is, IMO, CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n. That code is garbage.
No argument from me there...
greg k-h
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
