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Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 19:00:17 -0800
From: Seth Arnold <>
Subject: CVE Request: thermald


I discovered that the thermald temperature management daemon opens a file
with predictable filename in /tmp unsafely. Please assign a CVE number for
this issue:

In short:

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
	/* ... */
	if (!no_daemon) {
		daemonize((char *) "/tmp/", (char *) "/tmp/");
	} else

/* ... */

static void daemonize(char *rundir, char *pidfile) {
	/* ... */

	pid_file_handle = open(pidfile, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);

thermald runs as root; on systems that lack the Openwall-inspired symlink
and hardlink protections in world-writable directories this can be used to
write the process's pid to a file of the attacker's choosing.

Note that this affects only the main() function provided in the
android_main.cpp file; the main() routine in main.cpp does not have this


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