oss-security - Re: CVE request: python-gnupg before 0.3.5 shell injection

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Message-Id: <201402092140.s19LeOuA013343@linus.mitre.org>
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:40:24 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: hanno@...eck.de
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: python-gnupg before 0.3.5 shell injection

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> CVE request is still pending. I think we now need two:
> 1. Shell injection partly fixed in 0.3.5.
> 2. Incomplete fix for shell injection fixed in 0.3.6.

We think either 3 or 4 may be a better number of CVEs.

First, it seems that the shell_quote function in version 0.3.5 has two
fundamentally different problems with different flaw types and
different discoverers. The code in question is:

  elif len(s) >= 2 and (s[0], s[-1]) == ("'", "'"):
      result = '"%s"' % s.replace('"', r'\"')

The first problem, noted by Florian Weimer, is that this type of
attempt to quote ' characters by using " characters is inherently
wrong because the " and ' characters are not equivalent in the shell.
In his example, the input ends up surrounded by " characters, but the
string inside has a $( command substitution, and thus the command will
be executed. In other words, using " characters simply cannot work
correctly because "$(command)" is unsafe whereas '$(command)' is safe.

The second problem, noted by Matthew Daley, is that arbitrary
insertion of a \ character into a string is unsafe because it can
convert a single command into a list. This is independent of the
non-equivalence of " and ' in the shell. In particular, the same list
vulnerability can be seen with this 0.3.5 code variant:

  elif len(s) >= 2 and (s[0], s[-1]) == ('"', '"'):
      result = "'%s'" % s.replace("'", r"\'")

along with the analogous variant of the Python input. The only
difference is that the shell prints a different number of \
characters. In each case, the erroneous \ insertion separates the
string into a list of two commands, and the touch command is executed.

Specifically, using the original 0.3.5 code:

  >>> print shell_quote("'\\\"; touch foo #'")
  "'\\"; touch foo #'"

  % ls foo
  ls: cannot access foo: No such file or directory
  % echo "'\\"; touch foo #'"
  '\
  % ls foo
  foo

Using the above 0.3.5 code variant:

  >>> print shell_quote('"\\\'; touch foo #"')
  '"\\'; touch foo #"'

  % rm foo
  % ls foo
  ls: cannot access foo: No such file or directory
  % echo '"\\'; touch foo #"'
  "\\
  % ls foo
  foo

So, the CVE assignments for these issues are:

  CVE-2013-7323 Unrestricted use of unquoted strings in a shell,
                within version 0.3.4

  CVE-2014-1927 Erroneous assumptions about the usability of "
                characters within version 0.3.5, leading to attacks
                such as $( command substitution within a "-quoted
                string

  CVE-2014-1928 Erroneous insertion of a \ character within version
                0.3.5, leading to attacks involving command lists
                (such as lists separated by a ; character)

Second, 0.3.5 and 0.3.6 have a series of differences in handling of
command-line arguments. This seems to be most likely a reaction to
Florian Weimer's observation of "you need to make sure that you
prevent option injection through positional arguments." Does anyone
believe that option injection was impossible in 0.3.5? If not, we will
make a fourth CVE assignment.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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