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Message-Id: <201401092201.s09M1GcH015434@linus.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2014 17:01:16 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: ppandit@...hat.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE split and a missed file
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> -> net/ax25/af_ax25.c
The unpatched code does not have the fundamental problem of updating
msg_namelen in a situation where "sax" is uninitialized.
> -> net/rose/af_rose.c
The unpatched code does not have the fundamental problem of updating
msg_namelen in a situation where "srose" is uninitialized.
> -> net/compat.c
This is for the case of a nonzero msg_namelen accompanied by a NULL
msg_name, as mentioned in the comment in the commit. The same choice
was made in net/core/iovec.c (a file that you didn't ask about).
> -> net/socket.c
Lack of "msg_namelen = 0" statements is not something that would
really be considered a vulnerability in the previous net/socket.c
implementation. From the perspective of net/socket.c itself, the
"msg_namelen = 0" additions are a design improvement that can
contribute to the security of other code.
> -> net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c
The complete absence of a "msg_namelen =" statement in the unpatched
code seems to be a bug, but it's not the same as updating msg_namelen
in an uninitialized-data situation.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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