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Message-ID: <528C765E.3020500@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 09:44:14 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: P J P <ppandit@...hat.com>, Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: CVE requests for three Linux kernel issues
On 11/20/2013 07:49 AM, P J P wrote:
> Hello Moritz,
>
> +-- On Tue, 19 Nov 2013, Petr Matousek wrote --+
> | non-issues. Prasad (CC'ed) can provide reasons why.
> | > XADV-2013008 Linux Kernel 3.11.7 <= sk_attach_filter Kernel Heap Corruption
> | > http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Nov/139
>
> Here, integer overflow does not occur because 'fprog->len' is of type
> 'unsigned short' and sizeof(struct sock_filter) = 8 bytes.
>
> unsigned int fsize = sizeof(struct sock_filter) * fprog->len;
> = 8 * 65535(0xffff)
> = 524280 => 0x0007fff8
>
> ===
> // XXX Integer overflow (+ sizeof(*fp)) and causing a little allocation.
> fp = sock_kmalloc(sk, fsize+sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL);
> ===
>
> Adding few more bytes 'sizeof(*fp)' to 'fsize' above is unlikely to overflow
> an unsigned int.
Agreed, it's somewhat stupid though that we only check for that later on after
allocation in sk_chk_filter():
if (flen == 0 || flen > BPF_MAXINSNS)
return -EINVAL;
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