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Message-ID: <5270917A.4070203@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 22:56:26 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: mmcallis@...hat.com, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: carnil@...ian.org
Subject: Re: CVE Request: sup MUA Command Injection

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Hash: SHA1

On 10/29/2013 08:26 PM, Murray McAllister wrote:
> On 10/30/2013 07:44 AM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
>> 
>> On 10/29/2013 01:30 PM, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>> 
>>> On full-disclosure list there was reported a command injection 
>>> vulnerability in 'sup', a console-based email client.
>>> 
>>> [0] 
>>> http://rubyforge.org/pipermail/sup-talk/2013-October/004996.html
>>>
>>> 
[1] http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Oct/272
>>> 
>>> For reference quoting the upstream announce:
>>> 
>>> ----cut---------cut---------cut---------cut---------cut---------cut-----
>>>
>>>
>>
>>> 
Greetings,
>>> 
>>> Security advisory (#SBU1) for Sup
>>> 
>>> We have been notified of an potential exploit in the somewhat 
>>> careless way Sup treats attachment metadata in received
>>> e-mails. The issues should now be fixed and I have released Sup
>>> 0.13.2.1 and 0.14.1.1 which incorporates these fixes. Please
>>> upgrade immediately and also ensure that your mime-decode or
>>> mime-view hooks are secure [0], [1].
>>> 
>>> This is specifically related to using quotes (',") around
>>> filename or content_type which is already escaped using Ruby 
>>> Shellwords.escape - this means that the string (content_type, 
>>> filename) is intended to be used _without_ any further quotes. 
>>> Please make sure that if you use .mailcap (non OSX systems),
>>> you do not quote the string.
>>> 
>>> Credit goes to: joernchen of Phenoelit (http://phenoelit.de)
>>> who discovered and suggested fixes for these issues.
>>> 
>>> [0]
>>> https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/wiki/Viewing-Attachments 
>>> [1]
>>> https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/wiki/Secure-usage-of-Sup
>>> 
>>> You can use 'gem' to upgrade or install sup. Please report any 
>>> issues to: https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/issues
>>> 
>>> Regards, Gaute 
>>> ----cut---------cut---------cut---------cut---------cut---------cut-----
>>>
>>>
>>> 
Upstream fixed (as mentioned in announce) the issue in 0.13.2.1
>>> and 0.14.1.1. Commits:
>>> 
>>> [2] 
>>> https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/compare/release-0.13.2...release-0.13.2.1
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>> 
[3]
>> https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/compare/release-0.14.1...release-0.14.1.1
>>
>>>
>>>
>> 
Could a CVE be assigned for this issue?
>>> 
>>> Regards, Salvatore
>>> 
>> 
>> Please use CVE-2013-4478 for this issue.
> 
> To confirm, is this CVE for both the content_type issue and the
> filename issue?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> -- Murray McAllister / Red Hat Security Response Team

CVE-2013-4478 is for the issue specifically covered in
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Oct/att-272/whatsup.txt

which is
https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/commit/8b46cdbfc14e07ca07d403aa28b0e7bc1c544785
(security: shellwords escape attachment file names to prevent remote
code execution).

I missed that they fixed a second issue:

https://github.com/sup-heliotrope/sup/commit/ca0302e0c716682d2de22e9136400c704cc93e42
(security: prevent remote command injection in content_type)

Pleas use CVE-2013-4479 for this

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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