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Message-ID: <525E3018.2000007@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 00:20:08 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Michael Scherer <mscherer@...hat.com>,
info@...tstack.com
Subject: Re: CVE request for saltstack minion identity usurpation
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On 10/15/2013 11:54 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> On 10/11/2013 04:26 PM, Michael Scherer wrote:
>> Hi,
>
>> While looking for saltstack issues on github, i stumbled on this
>> pull request : https://github.com/saltstack/salt/pull/7356
>
>> It seems that saltstack, a client/server configuration system (
>> like puppet, chef, cfengine ) allowed to have any minions (
>> agent on the server to be configured ) to masquerade itself as
>> any others agents when requesting stuff from the master ( ie,
>> main server ). While I didn't fully check, this would permit a
>> compromised server to request data from another server, thus
>> leading to potential informations leak ( like passwword, etc ).
>
>> Can a CVE be assigned, and I will pass it to upstream on the bug
>> report ?
>
> Ok mmcallis@ researched these and found:
>
> CVE-2013-4435 saltstack Insufficient argument validation in
> several modules
>
> CVE-2013-4436 saltstack MITM ssh attack on salt-ssh
>
> CVE-2013-4437 saltstack Insecure usage of a predictable directory
> in /tmp and on minion (CVE MERGE of two tmp issues)
>
> CVE-2013-4438 saltstack pillar.ext or qemu_nbd.clear yaml string
> RCE
Argh. The above are currently embargoed, I misunderstood and thought
they were public (along with the following one). My apologies,
especially to upstream and users of saltstack. Adding saltstack info@
to the CC (can't find a security address).
> CVE-2013-4439 saltstack minion identity usurpation
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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