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Message-ID: <52452245.7020206@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 00:14:29 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: Open Source Security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Buffer overrun vulnerability in CHICKEN Scheme

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 09/26/2013 03:27 PM, Peter Bex wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> I'd like to request a CVE for a recently discovered vulnerability
> in CHICKEN Scheme.  It affects a very particular, not very common
> use of the read-string! procedure.  If given a buffer and #f (the
> Scheme value for "false") as the buffer's size (which should
> trigger automatic size detection but doesn't), it will read beyond
> the buffer, until the input port (file, socket, etc) is exhausted.
> This may result in the typical potential remote code execution or
> denial of service; in CHICKEN, these buffers are initially
> allocated on the stack and moved to the heap upon GC.
> 
> In normal usage, users would usually pass in the buffer's size.
> This is also the workaround for this bug.
> 
> For the official announcement, see 
> http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/chicken-announce/2013-09/msg00000.html
>
>  The discussion thread's final accepted patch is at 
> http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/chicken-hackers/2013-09/msg00009.html
>
> 
which got applied as
http://code.call-cc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=chicken-core.git;a=commit;h=cd1b9775005ebe220ba11265dbf5396142e65f26
> 
> All versions of CHICKEN prior to 4.8.0.5 and 4.8.3 (not yet
> released) are affected.
> 
> Cheers, Peter Bex
> 

Please use CVE-2013-4385 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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