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Message-ID: <5227E0C6.8050101@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Sep 2013 19:39:18 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>,
"cve-assign@...re.org" <cve-assign@...re.org>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: unauthorized host/service views
displayed in servicegroup view
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 09/04/2013 07:19 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> That somewhat proves my point. =). In both cases you're talking
> about intended security being violated or a security-relevant
> mistake. I don't see how relaxing ACLs intentionally, but still
> protected via authentication, meet either criteria.
>
> -- Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team
>
>
> On 2013-09-04, at 5:08 PM, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
>
>>>> I think the first question is what constitutes a security
>>>> flaw -- once that is defined, then I think what upstream does
>>>> is irrelevant. If it's a flaw, it's a flaw.
>
> CVE assignment by MITRE doesn't look at flaws in quite that way. If
> a vendor has developed and released software and then sends us a
> report that the software had a security-relevant mistake, or
> violated that vendor's intended security policy, that's usually
> enough for a CVE. Reports from third parties are viewed much more
> restrictively.
A good example of this is in action:
http://docs.python.org/2/library/pickle.html
no CVE (big warning, safe alternatives, etc.)
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=deserialization
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=deserializing
lots of CVEs
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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