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Message-ID: <51BFC25A.80009@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 20:13:46 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...re.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: Linux - ext4 support
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Hash: SHA1
On 06/17/2013 04:40 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 11:52:47PM +0200, Jonathan Salwan wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 10:29 PM, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
>> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 10:12:34PM +0200, Jonathan Salwan
>>> wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Could you assign a CVE for this issue please?
>>>>
>>>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971170
>>>
>>> I thought we (the ext4 developers and kernel security team)
>>> discussed this and determined that a user could _not_ trigger
>>> this problem. Or was I mistaken as to the output of that
>>> conversation?
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>>
>>> greg k-h
>>
>> Only with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE indeed.
>
> So, given that this really isn't a viable issue, why do you need a
> CVE?
>
> confused,
>
> greg k-h
>
Looking at man capabilities:
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
* Use reserved space on ext2 file systems;
* override disk quota limits;
* increase resource limits (see setrlimit(2));
* override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
so it would seem a user/process with this capability can DoS the
system regardless. However in this case would it be possible for the
attacker to trigger a DoS that is difficult (if not impossible) to
trace back to the attacker? In this case it might qualify for a CVE,
but I'd also want to get Steven's thoughts (cc'ed directly).
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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