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Message-ID: <CA+rthh9mT9m8_3OTH1aE0ufW6x3Fwho-=L4YiigJWAPhTUrbtQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:23:22 +0200
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: Re: Linux kernel: more net info leak fixes for v3.9

On Tue, Apr 23, 2013 at 12:22 PM, P J P <ppandit@...hat.com> wrote:
> +-- On Mon, 22 Apr 2013, cve-assign@...re.org wrote --+
> | ef3313e84acbf349caecae942ab3ab731471f1a1 CVE-2013-3223
>
>    *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
>
> Here, - *sax - seems to point to users `msg_name' object, no?

no ;)

> Because of the earlier copy_from_user in net/socket.h:

net/socket.c, I guess. The copy_from_user is followed by
verify_iovec() that sets msg_name to "addr" -- a kernel stack
variable.

>
> ===
>   get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat)
>    OR
>   copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)
> ===
>
> Is - memset(sax, 0, sizeof(full_sockaddr_ax25)) - setting users memory area?

No, for the above reason.

Please ask your colleagues at RedHat for any further explanations of
the code. AFAIK, oss-sec is no kernel hacker newbie forum ;)


Mathias

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