[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <516D9C6E.4050305@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2013 12:46:06 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Brian Martin <brian@...nsecurityfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Re: Summary of security bugs (now fixed) in user
namespaces
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 04/16/2013 11:34 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 2:01 AM, Kurt Seifried
> <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
>>
>> On 04/15/2013 04:45 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Brian Martin
>>> <brian@...nsecurityfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Andy;
>>>>
>>>> : I previously reported these bugs privatley. I'm
>>>> summarizing them for
>>>>
>>>> : the historical record. These bugs were never exploitable
>>>> on a : default-configured released kernel, but some 3.8
>>>> versions are : vulnerable depending on configuration.
>>>>
>>>> Do you know if these were patched, and therefore possibly
>>>> disclosed via the commits? With these details, it is
>>>> difficult to line them up to existing reports.
>>>
>>> Bug 1 should be fixed in:
>>>
>>> commit 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d Author: Eric
>>> W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 15
>>> 01:45:51 2013 -0700
>>>
>>> userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
>>
>> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
Please use CVE-2013-1956 for Linux Kernel namespaces userns: Don't
allow creation if the user is chrooted
>>
>>> Bug 2 is should be fixed by these:
>>>
>>> commit 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45 Author: Eric
>>> W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 22
>>> 03:10:15 2013 -0700
>>>
>>> vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
>>>
>>> commit 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 Author: Eric
>>> W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 22
>>> 04:08:05 2013 -0700
>>>
>>> vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
>>
>> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
Please use CVE-2013-1957 for Linux Kernel namespaces vfs: Carefully
propogate mounts across user namespaces
>>
>>> Bug 3 should be fixed in:
>>>
>>> commit 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 Author: Eric
>>> W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 15
>>> 01:03:33 2013 -0700
>>>
>>> scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof
>>> pids.
>>
>> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
>>
Please use CVE-2013-1958 for Linux Kernel namespaces scm: Require
CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids
As for the fourth bug he sent me details privately and a CVE was assigned.
> --Andy
>
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux)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=RRBe
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
